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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LAW AND POVERTY: SUMMARY
PREJUDGMENT WAGE GARNISHMENT HELD
UN CONSTITUTIONAL
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.' the United States Supreme
Court held a Wisconsin statute2 authorizing garnishment of wages
without notice and prior hearing to be a denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment. In 1966 Family Finance instituted
statutory garnishment proceedings; against Mrs. Sniadach and
against her employer as garnishee. Upon presentation of a promissory
note, the clerk issued a summons to the employer instructing him to
retain the wages then due Mrs. Sniadach, exempting only a
subsistence allowance. This garnishment established a lien on the
wages until there was a disposition of the principal action. Motions
for dismissal on the grounds of a denial of due process and equal
protection were denied by the clerk of court, the district court, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.4
Wage garnishment,8 which most states have among their creditor
collection devices, 6 is the attachment of unpaid wages owed to an
alleged debtor by his employer. Garnishment is most often invoked
by professional credit agencies as the surest, most expedient method
of enforcing payments7 and is used both to execute judgments and to
prevent the dissipation of wages before judgment is obtained 8 The
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.04, 267.07 (Supp. 1969). Subsequent to the Supreme Court
opinion, the Wisconsin legislature amended the state's garnishment statute so as to abolish
prejudgment garnishment. Senate Bill 315, ch. 127, Laws of 1969 (Aug. 8. 1969).
2 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04 (Supp. 1969), as amended, Senate Bill 315, ch. 127, Laws of
1969 (Aug. 8, 1969).
'Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
'The garnishment process is a special form of attachment enabling creditors to reach any
property of an alleged debtor in the hands of a third person. Hereinafter "'garnishment" will
refer to garnishment of wages.
'See M. Shimm, The Impact of State Law on Bankruptcy 14-18, 1968 (unpublished paper
at Duke University School of Law); Bruun. Wage Garnishment in Calfornia: .4 Study and
Recommendations, 53 CAU1F. L. REv. 1214, 1222, .1250-53 (1965); Note, Wage Garnishment
4s a Collection Device. 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759.
7See Bruun, supra note 6, at 1229-30, 1240, 1245.
'See Bruun, supra note 6. at 1215. See generally Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co.,
211 U.S. 239 (1908).
1285
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
latter use, outlawed in Sniadach, is prejudgment garnishment which
compels the employer to hold a statutorily set amount of his
employee's wages until judgment is rendered. To initiate the
proceeding, the creditor must file an affidavit with the clerk of court
stating the amount of his claim, that the debt is "owing and just," and
that the garnishee as employer is indebted to the defendant. Then
follows a summons to the garnishee establishing the lien. Noting that
the enormous expansion of installment credit in this decade has led to
a concomitant rise in wage garnishment,'" commentators have
agreed that this frequent conclusion of the credit cycle 'increases
bankruptcy and compounds unemployment problems." While seeking
total abandonment of wage garnishment, critics have in particular
deplored the prejudgment technique because its effect, and possibly
the creditor's purpose, is to destroy any defense to the action the
debtor may have, since he is forced to settle on the creditor's terms to
gain release of his wages and to protect his job.3 Many legislatures
have responded to the criticisms and social costs by allowing larger
subsistence exemptions, 4 and some states have effectively abolished
prejudgment relief by providing exemptions equal to the total amount
of back wages.' 5 Also, Congress sought to ameliorate partially the
harshness of prejudgment garnishment in the Truth in Lending Act"
through the prohibition of firing an employee whose wages are
garnished 7 and the establishment of large minimum exemption
requirements.'$
Prejudgment garnishment statutes are the source of due process
questions" since neither notice nor a hearing prior to the withholding
'Rougle v. Turk, 76 Idaho 427, 283 P.2d 915 (1955); United Colleries, Inc. v. Martin, 248
Ky. 808.60 S.W.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1933).
"Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington An Emipirical Study', 43 WASH. L. REV. 743
(1968).
"E.g.. Iruun. supra note 6. at 1234, 1246; 43 WASH. L. REV., supra note 10, at 744; 1967
Wis. L REV.. supra note 6. at 760-62: Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 338. 352 (1969).
"But see 1967 Wis. L. REV.. supra note 6. at 772.
3 Bruun, supra note 6, at 1246; Patterson, Foreword: Wage Garnishment-An
Extraordinary ReiedY Run Amuck, 43 WASH. L. REv. 735, 738 (1968). Employers often find
it less expensive to fire the garnished employee.
"See. e.g.. ALA. CODE tit. 7. § 630 (1960).
'$See. e.g.. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1968).
11§ 301, 82 Stat. 146 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 176. 196).
1 Id. § 304 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 197).
"Id. § 303 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 197).
"See. e.g.. Patterson. supra note 13, at 738-39.
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of wages is provided. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. ,2 where the adequacy of notice by publication to beneficiaries of a
common trust fund was questioned,2' the Supreme Court defined a
minimal standard for civil proceedings as requiring that "deprivation
of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. ' '2
Although the state's interest in closing trusts was great and its power
to so act was unchallenged, the Court held that the property interests
of known beneficiaries whom the publication did not reach required
greater protection. The effect of the decree closing the trust was "to
settle 'all questions respecting the management of the common
fund,' "2 thus severing the plaintiff's property rights without
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane, however, did not
solidify the minimal standards necessary for compliance with
procedural due process, since variations have resulted from the states'
power to establish their own procedures within the confines of due
process2' and the presumption of constitutionality accorded these
legislative acts.?5 The interplay of these three concepts-notice and
hearing as requisites of due process, legislative power to formulate
procedures, and the presumption of constitutionality accorded to that
formulation-has structured judicial determination of the due process
question created by prejudgment garnishment and attachment
statutes.
Until iniadach the United States Supreme Court had not
reviewed prejudgment garnishment, but in McKay v. Mclnnes" it had
summarily affirmed the constitutionality of a Maine statute
permitting prejudgment attachment without posting of bond or
presentment of an affidavit. The Maine Supreme Court ruled the
attachment procedure itself fulfilled the notice requirement of due
process, while the opportunity to be heard was provided in the trial of
the principal action.Y Since the lien was only temporary, and thus a
provisional remedy, the Maine court held that the deprivation
21339 U.S. 306 (1950).
11Se also Schroeder v. City of New York. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
2339 U.S. at 313.
21339 U.S. at 311.
21 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
"United States v. Carolene Products Co.. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
-279 U.S. 820 (1929).
"McInnes v. McKay. 127 Me. 110. 141 A. 699 (1928).
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involved was not an unconstitutional taking."8 In affirming the
decision, the United States Supreme Court ielied on Owenby v.
Morgan2 1 and Coffin Brothers v. Bennet." The Owenby case dealt
with the attachment of a foreign debtor's property pursuant to a
statute requiring the alleged debtor to post bond in the amount of the
creditor's claim before defending. Two related points were
emphasized in upholding the statute: (I) states are free to establish
their own procedures for the administration of justice within the limits
of due process, and (2) long standing practice supports the argument
that the procedure, though harsh, is a reasonable exercise of legislative
power. 31 The Georgia banking statute under attack in Coffin
described procedures for paying depositors in the event of insolvency.
The statute authorized the state bank superintendent to assess
shareholders an amount equal to the par value of their stock, If a
shareholder neglected or refused to pay, the superintendent could then
impose a lien on his property and seek its execution. The Court held
that since the stockholder was allowed to raise every defense in court,
by an affidavit of illegality, before execution, a reasonable
opportunity to be heard was provided."2 In deciding Sniadach3 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on these cases, especially the
temporary lien theory advanced in Mclnnes.34 Since it was established
that the legislature should determine to what actions the attachment
remedy will apply and since the deprivation was subject to judicial
scrutiny before finalization, the Wisconsin court found the statute to
be reasonable and in accord with due process requirements. Ruling on
a similar procedure a year later,s the Supreme Court of Vermont,
citing Mclnnes, affirmed the constitutionality of the Vermont
prejudgment garnishment statute upon the same rationale as that of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Sniadach.37
In Sniadach the United States Supreme Court stipulated that a
prejudgment statute on its face does not provide the requisite elements
-256 U.S. 94 (1921).
-277 U.S. 29 (1928).
31Owenby v. Morgan. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
-Coffin Bros. v. Bennet, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
=Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
"Id. at 167, 154 N.W.2d at 263.
"Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334, 341 (1902).
"' Shell Oil Co. v. Milne, 127 Vt. 249, 246 A.2d 837 (1968).
vlt,
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of notice and hearing explored in Mullane.3" The question then
became whether the wage lien was a taking sufficient to require these
protections. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
distinguished Owenby and Coffin as presenting extraordinary
situations, 39 and Mclnnes was distinguished as involving "a
procedural rule . . . for attachments in general." 4 0 Wage
garnishment, the Court said, involved a "specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system." 4 Disclaiming
any usurpation of legislative power, the majority opinion reviewed the
impact of wage garnishment on the employee and noted that loss of
family income and consequent poverty, the danger of fraud
perpetrated on the poor and ignorant, and the lack of adequate
subsistence exemptions were blatant weaknesses in the proceeding
which worked great hardship upon wage earners.42 It concluded that
such an "obvious" taking violates the fundamental principles of due
process when accomplished without notice and a hearing. 43 In
concurrence Justice Harlan expressly discounted the significance of a
per curiam opinion like MclnneS4 4 and indicated that the
deprivation of the "unrestricted use" of property amounts to actual
deprivation. 5 Mr. Justice Black attacked the Court's decision as
judicial legislation devoid of legal reasoning and agreed with the
Wisconsin Supreme Court that the temporary nature of the lien,
coupled with the opportunity for defense at trial, preserved the
constitutionality of the procedure as a reasonable exercise of
legislative judgment. Critical of Harlan's concurrence, Black
deplored the use of a "Natural Law concept" which ignored the
specific language of the Constitution and substituted for it the
"admonitions of the Court's own consciences."4
If the taking of property in prejudgment garnishment is
"obvious," one might ask why the procedure has survived until 1969,
for one must agree with Justice Black that Sniadach is a significant
departure from the history of garnishment and attachment
u395 U.S. at 341-42. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
=395 U.S. at 339.
aid. at 340.
41 Id.
Ih. at 34042.
'hl. at 342.
'id. at 344.
,Id. at 342-43.
11ld. at 350-51.
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proceedings. An analysis of the implications of the departure as well
as the rationale which supports it begins beneficially with the Court's
treatment of Owenby, Coffin, and Mclnnes, the cases traditionally
cited to support approval of prejudgment and postjudgment
attachments and garnishments. The statute in Owenby, protecting
creditors from foreign debtors beyond a court's jurisdiction and that
in Coffin, protecting the financial welfare of a "large segment of the
public," 47 are apparently founded on sufficiently high state interests in
contrast to the individual interest to justify expeditious statutory
procedures, since Justice Douglas preserved the decisions as special
situations. Mclnnes was arguably overruled sub silentio, although the
fact that the attachment of corporate interests and real estate in that
case did not have the critical effect on the individual as does
garnishment of wages may have prompted the qualification of
Mclnnes as involving a valid procedural rule for attachments in
general. 8 In Sniadach, as in Mclnnes, the Court was faced with the
threshold question of whether there was a taking of property at all,
before balancing the importance of the right to be heard against the
state interest in protecting creditors through summary proceedings.
Prejudgment proceedings were upheld previously because the alleged
debtor's property rights were considered not to have been disturbed,
since he maintained title until suffering adverse judgment in formal
adjudication. Such reasoning, however, evaded proper consideration
of the individual's interest involved, as the Wisconsin and Vermont
opinions reveal. In Sniadach the question of whether there was a
taking was answered in practical terms: "The result is that a
prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may . . . drive a
wage earning family to the wall." 49 Therefore, on balancing the
impact on the individual against the state interest, the Court could not
find the state interest paramount and held the provision for its
administration an unreasonable exercise of legislative power.
The Court's emphasis upon the effect of the deprivation on the
individual rather than upon traditional title concepts indicates, a
possible movement toward a redefinition of property, suggesting
ramifications in situations where the property right is even less clearly
vested in the defendant.5° The same view of property which supported
7 Patterson, supra note 13, at 739 n.9.
0395 U.S. at 340.
'id. at 341-42.
"See generall/ Reich, The New Propert. 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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the validity of prejudgment garnishment as a temporary taking
supports the conclusion that matters involving welfare benefits and
public housing may be summarily handled because the recipient or
tenant has no property right. Kelly v. Wyman,51 argued this term,
raised the question of whether summary withdrawals of welfare
payments violate due process. As commentators note, 2 the impact
on the recipient amounts to a deprivation of necessities while the
interest of the state is limited to insuring against excessive payments s-
Implicit in the recognition of the proper weight given individual
interests when balanced against those of the state is the assumption
that a recipient possesses a right in public benefits given him,u calling
forth protections accorded to rights in property.s An analogous
assumption inheres in the argument in Sanks v. Georgia," on the
docket this term, to overturn a summary eviction statute on due
process grounds. Incorporating the Sniadach language, the petitioner
argues that "a tenant's interest in his home is more than a simple
property right. Rather it is a right that involves 'a specialized type of
property,' *one that presents severe problems not only for our
economic system but for our social system as well."' ' The impli-
cations of a "new property" concept stretch far beyond the low
income or poverty area to procedures involving all manners of
licensing, veteran's benefits, franchise grants, and employment
opportunities.M This concept may mean that government must treat
11294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), oral argument sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 38
U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1969) (No. 62). The case is now awaiting decision. 38 U.S.L.W.
3231 (Dec. 23, 1969).
4See. e.g., Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37
FORD. L. REV. 604 (1969).
1id. at 609.
"See Reich, supra note 50, where Mr. Reich argues for a recognition of one's rights to
future benefits as well as for the accrued right in them after payment, since '[t]hese benefits
are based upon a recognition that misfortune and deprivation are often caused by forces far
beyond the control of the individual, such as technological change, variations in the demand
for goods, depressions, or wars." Id. at 785.
"See Morris, Welfare Benefits as Property: Requiring a Prior Hearing. 20 AD. L. REV. 487
(1968). But see Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE
LJ. 1234 (1967).
"Brief for Appellants, Sanks v. Georgia, appeal docketed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S. April
23, 1969) (No. 266). See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) involving an attack on
the same statute. Certiorari was denied on the grounds that the case was mooted, since the
tenant had been evicted. Mr. Juistice Douglas voiced a strong dissent on equal protection
grounds. 385 U.S. at 1037. 20 STAN. L. REv. 766 (1968) discusses the relative weights of the
equal protection and due process questions raised by Williamts.
"Brief for Appellants at 35, Sanks v. Georgia, appeal docketed. 38 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S.
April 23, 1969) (No. 266).
"Reich. supra note 50.
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all benefits, upon continuation of which there is great personal
dependence, as property which is entitled to constitutional
protection. 9 However, the situation of the poor litigant dramatizes
the need for recognition of a new property concept and thus is the
predictable source for its origination and growth. Judicial deference to
the plight of the class to which a litigant belongs has been witnessed in
the areas of criminal proceduree and civil rights,"' reflecting concern
for those who have little leverage in the legislative arena because of
their poverty, race, or criminal record. Such concern provides the
impetus for redefinition ot rights in terms of consequences and has
resulted in a high level of judicial activism which sets aside ordinary
presumptions attendant to legislative acts that tread heavily on an
important interest of a disadvantaged group."
Although the harsh consequences of the deprivation of property
are not as clearly present in repossession and confession of judgment,
Sniadach also renders these two summary proceedings suspect.
Repossession, usually provided by statute to secured creditors,3 may
59This is not to suggest necessarily that formal judicial proceedings be required in
administrative decision making. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privihkge
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1454 (1968):
Although the right to some form of process may be absolute, the extent to which
particular safeguards are available nonetheless varies according to the circumstances.
Where the consequence of error is relatively insubstantial, protection against the risk
of error through the use of elaborate quasi-judicial procedures is subject to a
constitutional trade-off with the need far administrative and fiscal economy. Id.
See also Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: .4 Survey of the Developing Law, 1969
DUKE L.J. 399, 447-56; Special Project, Public Housing. 22 VAND. L. REV. 875, 956-75
(1969). These studies, recognizing the economic barriers to full judicial participation in public
housing eviction procedures, explore procedural improvement possibilities within the housing
authorities which do not greatly impede administrative functions.
"Elg., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" E.g.. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "'atural-Law-Due-Process
Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969). Mr. Karst interprets Justice Stone's words as
making "the legitimacy of judicial protection of the losers in the legislative process turn on
the losers' long-term chances of becoming winners." Id. at 725. He explores the egalitarian
propensity of Justice Douglas, proposing that, primarily due to Douglas' influence, a "double
standard" of judicial review is developing in equal protection cases involving minority groups.
Id. at 724-25. The result is to 'invert the presumption of constitutionality" of a statute when
an important right of a minority group is involved. Id. at 735, 739-41. Cf Comment, The
Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Needs for amid
Requirements of a Prior Hearing. 68 MICH. L. REV. 112, 121 (1969).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503; see 2 G. GILMORE. SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1 at 1212 (1965).
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be exercised through self-help or by legal process in which an officer of
the court seizes the property." The confession of judgment procedure,
not a statutory device but included in many installment contracts," is
a grant of a power of attorney to someone, authorizing him to confess
judgment as to the buyer's default without notifying the buyer." .
However, the property involved when these devices are employed may
often not be necessities and, therefore, the harsh consequences test of
Sniadach is arguably not met. Nevertheless, the state interest in
providing expedient, inexpensive remedies to the creditor may not be
seriously frustrated by requiring minimum due process standards, and
since the consumer most often involved is the uneducated poor," his
interest might be accorded great weight. Two other factors would
enter this determination: the difficulty in assessing constitutionality
according to whether the collateral was a "necessity" and the
possibility that the absence of these remedies would greatly decrease
the availability of credit to low-income consumers. While Sniadach
clearly does not invalidate these summary procedures, it does present
the test against which they will be measured.
LIG. GIL.MORE.supra note 63, § 44.1 at 1212-13.
'"See Skilton & Helstad, Protection of 'the Installment Bit'er o1 Goods Uncer the, Uniformn
Commercial Code. 65 MICH. L. REv. 1465. 1475 (1967).
" Cf. id.
'5ee Lawson v. Mantell, No. 2324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.. filed Aug. 20, 1969) (3 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 105 (1969)). Following a complaint alleging a violation of due process under Sniadach,
a temporary restraining order was granted to a poor consumer enjoining the defendant and
the county sheriff from repossessing the plaintiffs property. hi.
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